Managing the Bank-System Crisis in Coordinated Market Economies: Institutions and Blame Avoidance Strategies in Sweden and Japan
2006 (English)In: Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration and Institutions, ISSN 0952-1895, Vol. 19, no 1, 43-74 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Sweden and Japan represent two different positions regarding policy-making facing similar crises of the bank systems. The Swedish public policy was encompassing, far-reaching and quick. The Japanese government hesitated for many years to take over bad loans, before they implemented policies of a more limited scope. Why?
In short, different institutional settings lead the main actors into different paths of reactions in order to avoid blame. In the Japanese case, the very close relationship between private banks and the Ministry of Finance, in combination with the lesser degree of widespread perceptions of a system-crisis, made it more urgent as well as possible to conceal the actual state of affairs for the politicians. Confronted with the threat of losing power over the financial administration to a new agency, the ministry postponed the reforms in order to conceal the deep financial problems. The institutional setting was different in Sweden. The deregulation had separated the government from the administration of banks. Among the public deteriorating economic conditions were easily connected to the banks. This brought about political unity. It was possible to put the blame on the banks and take the credit for the efforts to tide up the mess without losing credibility.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Malden: Wiley-Blackwell, 2006. Vol. 19, no 1, 43-74 p.
Bank-system Crisis, Institutions, Blame-avoidance
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-84505DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0491.2006.00303.xOAI: oai:DiVA.org:uu-84505DiVA: diva2:112413