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Estimation With Strategic Sensors
2017 (English)In: IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, ISSN 0018-9286, E-ISSN 1558-2523, Vol. 62, no 2, p. 724-739Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

© 1963-2012 IEEE. We introduce a model of estimation in the presence of strategic, self-interested sensors. We employ a game-Theoretic setup to model the interaction between the sensors and the receiver. The cost function of the receiver is equal to the estimation error variance while the cost function of the sensor contains an extra term which is determined by its private information. We start by the single sensor case in which the receiver has access to a noisy but honest side information in addition to the message transmitted by a strategic sensor. We study both static and dynamic estimation problems. For both these problems, we characterize a family of equilibria in which the sensor and the receiver employ simple strategies. Interestingly, for the dynamic estimation problem, we find an equilibrium for which the strategic sensor uses a memory-less policy. We generalize the static estimation setup to multiple sensors with synchronous communication structure (i.e., all the sensors transmit their messages simultaneously). We prove the maybe surprising fact that, for the constructed equilibrium in affine strategies, the estimation quality degrades as the number of sensors increases. However, if the sensors are herding (i.e., copying each other policies), the quality of the receiver’s estimation improves as the number of sensors increases. Finally, we consider the asynchronous communication structure (i.e., the sensors transmit their messages sequentially).

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2017. Vol. 62, no 2, p. 724-739
Keywords [en]
Estimation, Kalman filtering, game theory, strategic sensors
National Category
Control Engineering
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-363590DOI: 10.1109/TAC.2016.2571779OAI: oai:DiVA.org:uu-363590DiVA, id: diva2:1256990
Available from: 2018-10-18 Created: 2018-10-18 Last updated: 2018-10-18

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Teixeira, Andre M. H.
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