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Assertion, Lying, and Untruthfully Implicating
Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy.ORCID iD: 0000-0002-1177-4242
2018 (English)In: Oxford Handbook of Assertion / [ed] Sanford Goldberg, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018Chapter in book (Refereed)
Abstract [en]

This chapter explores the prospects for justifying the somewhat widespread, somewhat firmly held sense that there is some moral advantage to untruthfully implicating over lying. I call this the "Difference Intuition." I define lying in terms of asserting, but remain open about what precise definition best captures our ordinary notion. I define implicating as one way of meaning something without asserting it. I narrow down the kind of untruthful implicating that should be compared with lying for purposes of evaluating whether there is a moral difference between them. Just as lying requires a robust form of assertion, so the kind of untruthful implicating to be compared with lying requires a robust form of implicating. Next, I set out various ways of sharpening the Difference Intuition and survey a range of approaches to justifying one class of sharpenings. I finish by sketching an approach to justifying an alternative sharpening of the Difference Intuition, which is inspired by John Stuart Mill's discussion of lying.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018.
Keywords [en]
assertion, lying, implicating, ethics of lying and deception, lying/misleading distinction
National Category
Philosophy
Research subject
Philosophy
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-372163Libris ID: bl1k9td486h6b25lISBN: 9780190675233 (electronic)OAI: oai:DiVA.org:uu-372163DiVA, id: diva2:1275435
Available from: 2019-01-06 Created: 2019-01-06 Last updated: 2019-09-13Bibliographically approved

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