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Can overconfidence be used as an indicator of reconstructive rather than retrieval processes?
Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Government.ORCID iD: 0000-0002-8289-7469
1995 (English)In: Cognition, ISSN 0010-0277, E-ISSN 1873-7838, Vol. 54, no 1, p. 99-130Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

In a recent paper Wagenaar (1988) suggested that overconfidence can be used as an indicator of reconstructive processes which allow responses based on inference to be distinguished from responses based on retrieval. The ecological models (Björkman, in press; Gigerenzer, Hoffrage, & Kleinbölting, 1991; Juslin, 1993a, 1993b, 1994) provide a more positive view of the calibration of reconstructive responses. In this paper we compare these two views and argue that overconfidence cannot be considered a reliable indicator of reconstructive processes since people may be well calibrated for tasks that require inference, provided that tasks are selected in an unbiased manner. Instead, we discuss two different models: the response-independence model which is appropriate to retrieval, and the response-dependence model which applies to inference. These two models predict different distributions of solution probabilities and they therefore provide a criterion by which we can distinguish between direct retrieval and reconstruction. In two empirical studies modelled after Experiment 1 in Wagenaar's (1988) paper it is shown that calibration can be very similar and quite reasonable both for tasks that are dominated by inference and tasks that are dominated by retrieval processes. In Experiment 2 we show that the two conditions nevertheless differ in regard to the distributions of solution probabilities in the manner predicted by the two response models presented in the paper. It is proposed that the issue of which is the most appropriate interpretation of solution probabilities is neglected, and that the criterion should be of interest also to applications outside the domain of calibration research.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
1995. Vol. 54, no 1, p. 99-130
Keywords [en]
CONFIDENCE; CALIBRATION; KNOWLEDGE; REALISM; JUDGMENTS; ACCURACY; MODELS; MEMORY
National Category
Social Sciences
Research subject
Psychology
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-372434DOI: 10.1016/0010-0277(94)00642-XOAI: oai:DiVA.org:uu-372434DiVA, id: diva2:1275837
Available from: 2019-01-07 Created: 2019-01-07 Last updated: 2019-01-07

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Publisher's full texthttps://doi.org/10.1016/0010-0277(94)00642-X

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Persson, Thomas

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