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Moraliska aspekter av gruvbrytning i Gallók/Kallak: En innehållslig idéanalys av moralisk sentimentalism som möjlig beslutsmodell i fråga om rättvist beslutsfattande
Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Theology, Department of Theology.
2018 (Swedish)Independent thesis Advanced level (degree of Master (Two Years)), 20 credits / 30 HE creditsStudent thesis
Abstract [en]

Does moral sentimentalism provide resources for reasonable decision making? In this essay I look closer on whether empathy truly is a necessary component when it comes to decision making, and also how and why moral sentimentalism seems to be undermining itself in certain aspects related to the nature of the theory itself. The thoughts of moral sentimentalism have been applied onto the conflict concerning the rights to land in the area of Gallók/Kallak, in order to provide a clear example of how the theory of moral sentimentalism may be applied. To be able to provide an answer for the main question of the essay, a number of pro and contra-arguments for moral sentimentalism have been used as guidelines for the main discussion, as well as a number of statements that sum up the main aim of moral sentimentalism as an ethical theory. In the analysis of the essay, an attempt to test if these arguments and statements are strong and clear enough to be questioned from different angles is made. By questioning these arguments and statements, I have realised that some of them seems to be undermining rather than helping the theory of moral sentimentalism when they are questioned. In the conclusion of the essay, I come to the answer that the theory of moral sentimentalism on it’s own does not contain what is needed in order to provide resources for reasonable decision making. I also find that moral sentimentalism does not manage to provide enough support for its claim that empathy is indeed crucial when it comes to decision making in the conflict concerning the rights to land in the area of Gallók/Kallak (or in decision making in conflicts in general, apart from on a 1:1 level where everyone involved in the conflict has a somewhat deep understanding for one another.) But, despite this realization, moral sentimentalism can still function as a useful validity criterion (rather than a decision model) in terms of decision making in situations of conflict.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2018. , p. 64
Keywords [en]
ethics, sentimentalism, michael slote, david hume, kallak, gallók, moral
National Category
Ethics Religious Studies
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-375003OAI: oai:DiVA.org:uu-375003DiVA, id: diva2:1282452
Subject / course
Studies in Systematic Theology, Ethics and Philosophy of Religion
Supervisors
Examiners
Available from: 2019-01-25 Created: 2019-01-24 Last updated: 2019-01-25Bibliographically approved

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