The consistency principle for set-valued solutions and a new direction for normative game theory
1998 (English)Report (Other academic)
We extend the consistency principle for strategic games (Peleg and Tijs (1996)) to apply to solutions which assign to each game a collection of product sets of strategies. Such solutions turn out to satisfy desirable properties that solutions assigning to each game a collection of strategy profiles lack. Our findings lead us to propose a new direction for normative game theory.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Uppsala: Nationalekonomiska institutionen , 1998. , 18 p.
Working paper / Department of Economics, Uppsala University (Print), ISSN 0284-2904 ; 1998:11
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-2417ISBN: 99-2616936-8OAI: oai:DiVA.org:uu-2417DiVA: diva2:128678