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Lies, Harm, and Practical Interests
Uppsala University, Swedish Collegium for Advanced Study (SCAS).ORCID iD: 0000-0002-7467-7263
2019 (English)In: Philosophy and phenomenological research, ISSN 0031-8205, E-ISSN 1933-1592, Vol. 98, no 2, p. 329-345Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

This paper outlines an account of the ethics of lying, which accommodates two main ideas about lying. The first of these, Anti‐Deceptionalism, is the view that lying does not necessarily involve intentions to deceive. The second, Anti‐Absolutism, is the view that lying is not always morally wrong. It is argued that lying is not wrong in itself, but rather the wrong in lying is explained by different factors in different cases. In some cases such factors may include deceptive intentions on the part of the liar. In other cases, where such intentions are not found, the wrong in lying may be explained by other factors. Moreover, it is argued that the interaction between considerations against lying and considerations against telling the truth are sensitive to the practical interests of those lied to. When the topic of the lie in question matters little to the victim's rational decision making, the threshold for when considerations against telling the truth can outweigh considerations against lying are lowered. This account is seen to explain why lying to avoid little harm is sometimes permissible, and sometimes not.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2019. Vol. 98, no 2, p. 329-345
National Category
Philosophy
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-379057DOI: 10.1111/phpr.12439ISI: 000462056000004OAI: oai:DiVA.org:uu-379057DiVA, id: diva2:1295405
Available from: 2019-03-11 Created: 2019-03-11 Last updated: 2019-04-15Bibliographically approved

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Stokke, Andreas

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