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The No Act Objection: Act-Consequentialism and Coordination Games
Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.ORCID iD: 0000-0001-8017-0672
2019 (English)In: Thought: a journal of philosophy, ISSN 0340-6245, E-ISSN 2161-2234, Vol. 8, no 3, p. 179-189Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

Coordination games show that all individuals can do what is right according to act-consequentialism, even if they do not bring about the best outcome as a group. This creates two problems for act-consequentialism. First, it cannot accommodate the intuition that there is some moral failure in these cases. Second, its formulation as a criterion of rightness conflicts with the underlying act-consequentialist concern that the best outcome is brought about. The collectivist view solves these problems by holding that any group of two or more individual agents, and only individual agents, is a collective agent who itself can act rightly or wrongly. When such a collective agent does what is wrong, there is a moral failure. When all collective agents do what is right, the best outcome is brought about. In this paper, I defend the collectivist view against the No Act Objection, according to which the doings of many so called disunified collectives are not acts.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2019. Vol. 8, no 3, p. 179-189
Keywords [en]
act-consequentialism, collective agents, coordination games, consequentialism, action theory
National Category
Philosophy
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-394975DOI: 10.1002/tht3.418ISI: 000486175700003OAI: oai:DiVA.org:uu-394975DiVA, id: diva2:1360203
Available from: 2019-10-11 Created: 2019-10-11 Last updated: 2019-10-11Bibliographically approved

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Rosenqvist, Simon

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