uu.seUppsala University Publications
Change search
CiteExportLink to record
Permanent link

Direct link
Cite
Citation style
  • apa
  • ieee
  • modern-language-association
  • vancouver
  • Other style
More styles
Language
  • de-DE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
  • fi-FI
  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
  • sv-SE
  • Other locale
More languages
Output format
  • html
  • text
  • asciidoc
  • rtf
Optimal commodity taxation with varying quality of goods
Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics. Uppsala Univ, Dept Econ, Box 513, SE-75120 Uppsala, Sweden;Uppsala Ctr Fiscal Studies, Uppsala, Sweden;Uppsala Ctr Labor Studies, Uppsala, Sweden;CESifo, Munich, Germany;Linnaeus Univ, Ctr Labour Market & Discriminat Studies, Vaxjo, Sweden.
Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics. Uppsala Univ, Dept Econ, Box 513, SE-75120 Uppsala, Sweden;Uppsala Ctr Fiscal Studies, Uppsala, Sweden;CESifo, Munich, Germany.ORCID iD: 0000-0001-8527-1501
CESifo, Munich, Germany;Univ Milan, Dept Law, Milan, Italy;Bocconi Univ Milan, Dondena Ctr Res Social Dynam, Milan, Italy.
2016 (English)In: Research in Economics, ISSN 1090-9443, E-ISSN 1090-9451, Vol. 70, no 1, p. 89-100Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

A standard result in the optimal taxation literature is that when agents differ in market ability and the government aims at redistributing from high- to low-skilled agents by means of an optimal nonlinear labor income tax and a set of commodity taxes, an optimally designed commodity tax structure should encourage (discourage) the consumption of goods/services that are complement with labor (leisure). In this paper we highlight that when agents can choose both the quality and the quantity of a given good/service, this standard commodity tax result needs to be qualified. First, we show that it becomes relevant to distinguish between specific and ad valorem taxes/subsidies. Second, whether the standard result holds or not depends on how the concept of labor (leisure) complement is defined, namely, whether it is defined in terms of number of units or in terms of expenditure. We also show that levying specific and ad valorem taxes at opposite signs on a given good can be a feature of the second-best optimum. (C) 2015 University of Venice. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
ELSEVIER SCI LTD , 2016. Vol. 70, no 1, p. 89-100
Keywords [en]
Nonlinear income taxation, Commodity taxation, Redistribution, Varying quality
National Category
Economics
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-400815DOI: 10.1016/j.rie.2015.11.005ISI: 000409176100008OAI: oai:DiVA.org:uu-400815DiVA, id: diva2:1382484
Funder
Riksbankens JubileumsfondAvailable from: 2020-01-03 Created: 2020-01-03 Last updated: 2020-01-03Bibliographically approved

Open Access in DiVA

No full text in DiVA

Other links

Publisher's full text

Authority records BETA

Bastani, SpencerBlomquist, Sören

Search in DiVA

By author/editor
Bastani, SpencerBlomquist, Sören
By organisation
Department of Economics
In the same journal
Research in Economics
Economics

Search outside of DiVA

GoogleGoogle Scholar

doi
urn-nbn

Altmetric score

doi
urn-nbn
Total: 1 hits
CiteExportLink to record
Permanent link

Direct link
Cite
Citation style
  • apa
  • ieee
  • modern-language-association
  • vancouver
  • Other style
More styles
Language
  • de-DE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
  • fi-FI
  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
  • sv-SE
  • Other locale
More languages
Output format
  • html
  • text
  • asciidoc
  • rtf