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It has been well-established that the seventeenth century marks the birth of modern philosophy. The question is how this shift should be understood. Many previous analyses have attempted to explain this historical transition empirically. I instead try to develop what I call a “Kantian” or “transcendental” historiography, using analytic resources from philosophers and historians such as Immanuel Kant, Martin Heidegger, Michel Foucault and Reinhart Koselleck. Rather than trying to identify the causes of modernity, I interpret texts from the period 1570–1650 in order to identify the logic and categories presupposed by modern philosophy, or its “transcendental” conditions. This is done by way of an interpretation of the history of the concept of causality – a concept chosen for its centrality to the modern philosophical project. By interpreting how the concept of causality changed around the year 1600, I hope to show how philosophical modernity became possible, or what transcendental logic it presupposes.

I firstly show how the pre-modern category of “principles” made possible the concept of “formal causality”, which was ordered according to a logic of origins and intrinsic natures, whereas the modern category of “shape” made possible a philosophy of mechanisms. Secondly, I show how the pre-modern category of “place” made possible the concept of “material causality”, which was ordered according to a logic of indefiniteness and presence, whereas the modern category of “extension” made possible a philosophy of definite and extended stuff. Thirdly, I show how the pre-modern category of “purposeful motion” made possible the concept of “final causality”, which was ordered according to a logic of natural striving, whereas the modern category of “inertial motion” made possible a philosophy of how passivity must be overcome by a force. Fourthly, I show how the pre-modern category of “creativity” made possible the concept of “efficient causality”, which was ordered according to a logic of creative activity, whereas the modern category of “contact-causation” made possible a philosophy where phenomena are pushed in motion by direct contact. My original contribution lies in showing how modern philosophy was made possible by a tectonic restructuring of the transcendental logic of thought. Around 1570, philosophers suddenly started presupposing a new logic and new categories, which in turn made possible new concepts, metaphors, theories, problematics and modes of explanation. The abruptness and generality of this shift presents challenges to previous attempts to explain modernity as an intentional, rational and empirical process.