2006 (English)Book (Refereed)
In this book, Folke Tersman explores what we can learn about the nature of moral thinking from moral disagreement. He explains how diversity of opinion on moral issues undermines the idea that moral convictions can be objectively valued. Arguments on moral thinking are often criticized for not being able to explain why there is a contrast between ethics and other areas in which there is disagreement, but where one does not give up the idea of an objective truth, as in the natural sciences. Tersman shows that the contrast has to do with facts about when, and on what basis, moral convictions can be correctly attributed to an agent or speaker.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press , 2006, 1. , 160 p.
, Cambridge Studies in Philosophy, ISSN 0950-6306
Moral Realism, Expressivism, Disagreement, Cognitivism, The Latitude Idea, Moral Relativism
Research subject Practical Philosophy
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-99480ISBN: 0-521-85338-9ISBN: 978-0-521-85338-5OAI: oai:DiVA.org:uu-99480DiVA: diva2:207982