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Moral Disagreement
Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
2006 (English)Book (Refereed)
Abstract [en]

In this book, Folke Tersman explores what we can learn about the nature of moral thinking from moral disagreement. He explains how diversity of opinion on moral issues undermines the idea that moral convictions can be objectively valued. Arguments on moral thinking are often criticized for not being able to explain why there is a contrast between ethics and other areas in which there is disagreement, but where one does not give up the idea of an objective truth, as in the natural sciences. Tersman shows that the contrast has to do with facts about when, and on what basis, moral convictions can be correctly attributed to an agent or speaker.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press , 2006, 1. , 160 p.
, Cambridge Studies in Philosophy, ISSN 0950-6306
Keyword [en]
Moral Realism, Expressivism, Disagreement, Cognitivism, The Latitude Idea, Moral Relativism
National Category
Research subject
Practical Philosophy
URN: urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-99480ISBN: 0-521-85338-9ISBN: 978-0-521-85338-5OAI: oai:DiVA.org:uu-99480DiVA: diva2:207982
Available from: 2009-03-14 Created: 2009-03-14 Last updated: 2013-02-12Bibliographically approved

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