Crispin Wright on moral disagreement
1998 (English)In: Philosophical quarterly (Print), ISSN 0031-8094, Vol. 48, no 192, 359-365 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Crispin Wright holds that moral realism is implausible since it is not a priori that every moral disagreement involves cognitive shortcomings. I develop two responses to this argument. First, a realist may argue that it holds for at least one of the parties to any disagreement that he holds false background beliefs (moral or otherwise) or that his verdict to the disputed judgment fails to cohere with his system. Second, he may argue that if none of the verdicts involves shortcomings, the appropriate conclusion is that the disagreement is not genuine, since we must otherwise attribute an inexplicable error.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
1998. Vol. 48, no 192, 359-365 p.
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-99707OAI: oai:DiVA.org:uu-99707DiVA: diva2:208593