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Noncognitivism and inconsistency
Uppsala University, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
1995 (English)In: The Southern Journal of Philosophy, ISSN 0038-4283, Vol. 33, no 3, 361-371 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

A popular objection to ethical noncognitivism is that it fails to account for the realist appearance of moral discourse. This paper focuses on one feature of this appearance: Our tendency to seek consistency among our moral views. Contrary to what has been argued, I hold that noncognitivists can rationalize this practice. In support of this position, I mention some considerations indicating why, on a noncognitivist view, it is reasonable to seek moral consistency. However, I also discuss how well the main competitor to noncognitivism (that is, moral realism) fares in rendering this practice reasonable.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
1995. Vol. 33, no 3, 361-371 p.
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Research subject
Practical Philosophy
URN: urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-99709OAI: oai:DiVA.org:uu-99709DiVA: diva2:208595
Available from: 2009-03-18 Created: 2009-03-18 Last updated: 2009-03-19Bibliographically approved

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