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Coherence and disagreement
Uppsala University, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
1992 (English)In: Philosophical Studies, ISSN 0031-8116, Vol. 65, no 3, 305-317 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Dordrecht: Springer , 1992. Vol. 65, no 3, 305-317 p.
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Practical Philosophy
URN: urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-99713OAI: oai:DiVA.org:uu-99713DiVA: diva2:208599
A traditional objection to coherentism is that there may be incompatible though equally coherent sets of beliefs. The purpose of the paper is to assess this objection. It is argued that the better a belief "p" coheres with the system of a person, the less likely it is that the negation of the belief coheres equally well with someone else's system, or even that there is someone else who believes the negation of "p". The arguments are based on two plausible assumptions about coherence, and some more controversial assumptions concerning meaning and interpretation.Available from: 2009-03-18 Created: 2009-03-18 Last updated: 2009-03-19Bibliographically approved

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