Combinatorial and Simultaneous Auction: A Pragmatic Approach to Tighter Bounds on Expected Revenue
2009 (English)Report (Other academic)
It is a common belief that combinatorial auctions provide good solutions to resource-allocation in multiple-object markets with synergies. In this work we adopt a pragmatic approach to examining the revenue bounds on combinatorial and simultaneous auctions. The theoretical bounds from our previous work utilize a large number of bidders in order to show that combinatorial auctions yield a higher expected revenue. It is reasonable to believe that the true bounds are much tighter. We argue that this is the indeed the case and that the first-price combinatorial auction is revenue superior even when a relatively small number of bidders participate. The argument is based on three methods. (i) heuristic equilibrium-strategy search, (ii) sampling of the expected revenue in the first-price sealed-bid combinatorial auction, and (iii) a tightened theoretical upper bound on the sealed-bid simultaneous auction in the case of few bidders.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Technical report / Department of Information Technology, Uppsala University, ISSN 1404-3203 ; 2009-013
combinatorial auction, first-price, heuristic, equilibrium, strategy, expected revenue, multi-object auction, auction, multiple-item, simulatneous auction, bidding, synergy, synergies
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-102933OAI: oai:DiVA.org:uu-102933DiVA: diva2:217100