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Stationary equilibria in bargaining with externalities
Swedish Competition Authority.
Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
2009 (English)In: Games and Economic Behavior, ISSN 0899-8256, E-ISSN 1090-2473, Vol. 65, no 2, 318-338 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

This paper studies infinite-horizon bargaining between a seller and multiple buyers when externalities are present. We extend the analysis in Jehiel and Moldovanu by allowing for both pure and mixed equilibria [Jehiel, P., Moldovanu, B., 1995a. Cyclical delay in bargaining with externalities. Rev. Econ. Stud. 62, 619–637]. A characterization of the stationary subgame perfect equilibria in generic games is presented. Equilibria with delay exist only for strong positive externalities. Since each buyer receives a positive payoff when the seller makes an agreement with some other buyer, positive externalities induce a war of attrition between buyers.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2009. Vol. 65, no 2, 318-338 p.
Keyword [en]
Bargaining, Externalities, Delay
National Category
Research subject
URN: urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-108488DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2008.02.012ISI: 000264400600002OAI: oai:DiVA.org:uu-108488DiVA: diva2:236040
Available from: 2009-09-20 Created: 2009-09-20 Last updated: 2010-12-29Bibliographically approved

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