uu.seUppsala University Publications
Change search
CiteExportLink to record
Permanent link

Direct link
Cite
Citation style
  • apa
  • ieee
  • modern-language-association
  • vancouver
  • Other style
More styles
Language
  • de-DE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
  • fi-FI
  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
  • sv-SE
  • Other locale
More languages
Output format
  • html
  • text
  • asciidoc
  • rtf
Dogma: Vi är alla stygga barn
Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Logic and Metaphysics.
2009 (Swedish)In: Norsk Filosofisk Tidsskrift, ISSN 0029-1943, Vol. 44, no 3-4, 176-190 p.Article in journal, Editorial material (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

Niklas Forsberg: Dogma: We are All Wicked Children

This paper discusses the question of dogmatism in relation to Wittgenstein’s philosophy. I argue that Wittgenstein’s philosophy is both a break from, yet dependent upon, the analytical philosophical tradition. If this fact is not acknowledged one runs the risk of appropriating Wittgenstein’s philosophy dogmatically.

Glock’s reading of Wittgenstein is employed to show the mistake in reading Wittgenstein as if he worked entirely within the analytic philosophical tradition. Such readings generally attribute theses to Wittgenstein – in direct contrast to his own intentions – and they tend to disregard or misrepresent Wittgenstein’s deeply critical attitude towards the «scientific spirit» of the age.

It is also argued that a reading that focuses solely on Wittgenstein’s more methodologically oriented remarks runs the risk of misrepresenting them, if they are disconnected from the particular philosophical problems that they are internally connected to.

Finally, it is argued that the struggle against dogmatism is a constant struggle. Dogmatism is, in Wittgenstein’s conception of it, not something that can be fully avoided since dogmatism is inherent in the philosophical desire itself. Dogmatism in philosophy is not merely dogmatism in academic philosophy but comes together with a very natural desire to establish one fixed meaning for our words.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Oslo: Universitetsförlaget , 2009. Vol. 44, no 3-4, 176-190 p.
Keyword [en]
Cavell, dogmatism, Glock, method, Wittgenstein
National Category
Philosophy
Research subject
Theoretical Philosophy
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-119821OAI: oai:DiVA.org:uu-119821DiVA: diva2:301027
Available from: 2010-03-02 Created: 2010-03-02 Last updated: 2013-10-18Bibliographically approved

Open Access in DiVA

No full text

Authority records BETA

Forsberg, Niklas

Search in DiVA

By author/editor
Forsberg, Niklas
By organisation
Logic and Metaphysics
In the same journal
Norsk Filosofisk Tidsskrift
Philosophy

Search outside of DiVA

GoogleGoogle Scholar

urn-nbn

Altmetric score

urn-nbn
Total: 471 hits
CiteExportLink to record
Permanent link

Direct link
Cite
Citation style
  • apa
  • ieee
  • modern-language-association
  • vancouver
  • Other style
More styles
Language
  • de-DE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
  • fi-FI
  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
  • sv-SE
  • Other locale
More languages
Output format
  • html
  • text
  • asciidoc
  • rtf