uu.seUppsala University Publications
Change search
ReferencesLink to record
Permanent link

Direct link
A social procedural approach to the Pareto optimization problematique: Part II. Institutionalized procedures and their limitations
Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Sociology.ORCID iD: 0000-0001-9350-8652
2009 (English)In: Quality and quantity, ISSN 0033-5177, E-ISSN 1573-7845, Vol. 43, no 5, 805-832 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

In the previous article (Part I) we briefly introduced the Pareto problematique, selective criticism of it, and Generalized Game Theory's (GGT) approach to the Pareto optimization problematique. GGT stresses the embeddedness and multilevel character of social games; its application to optimization problems leads to a conceptualization of two-phase societal procedures to achieve agreements for change-or, conversely, maintaining-states of the world. In this part two general types of games are distinguished analytically in the 2-phase process: on the one hand, elementary strategic games take place among agents in the first phase in diverse social settings, and, on the other hand, regulative conflict resolution or collective improvement games are organized as procedures in the second phase. Many elementary strategic games end in stalemates, difficult-to-resolve conflicts, and non-optimal outcomes such as occur in collective action or prisoner dilemma type games. This type of situation is the point of departure for the activation of a meta-game regulatory procedure for resolving stalemates, conflicts, and non-optimal states in order to accomplish societal improvements and efficiencies. In a word, the paper identifies and models institutionalized regulatory mechanisms that resolve conflicts, inefficient or non-optimal states, and disequilibria; and lead thereby to solution or resolution of Pareto optimization problems in the face of general non-unanimity or conflict about the outcomes. In addition, the article present more detailed models of the adjudication, negotiation, and democratic procedures introduced in the previous article and discusses their legitimacy bases, the limits of such societal procedures, and the accomplishment of societal efficiencies through the procedures.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2009. Vol. 43, no 5, 805-832 p.
Keyword [en]
Pareto optimization, Societal procedures, Conflict resolution, Legitimacy, Limitations, GGT
National Category
Social Sciences
URN: urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-128310DOI: 10.1007/s11135-009-9236-9ISI: 000268880800008OAI: oai:DiVA.org:uu-128310DiVA: diva2:331160
Available from: 2010-07-21 Created: 2010-07-20 Last updated: 2014-01-16Bibliographically approved

Open Access in DiVA

No full text

Other links

Publisher's full text

Search in DiVA

By author/editor
Burns, Tom R.
By organisation
Department of Sociology
In the same journal
Quality and quantity
Social Sciences

Search outside of DiVA

GoogleGoogle Scholar
The number of downloads is the sum of all downloads of full texts. It may include eg previous versions that are now no longer available

Altmetric score

Total: 163 hits
ReferencesLink to record
Permanent link

Direct link