Quis custodiet Ipsos custodes? or measuring and evaluating the effectiveness of competition enforcement
2008 (English)In: De Economist, ISSN 0013-063X, E-ISSN 1572-9982, Vol. 156, no 4, 387-409 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
This article surveys, discusses and classifies methods for ex-post evaluation of the efficiency of competition authorities: court appeals, peer reviews, case studies, event studies, (authorities’ own) bottom-up calculations of consumer gains, deadweight-loss estimates, cross-country panel studies etc. Based on empirical estimates from other types of studies and on a simple oligopoly model, one conclusion is that many bottom-up calculations are based on exaggerated estimates of gains from cartel enforcement, relative to those from merger enforcement. Another conclusion is that authorities’ ex-post self evaluations are of limited value, relative to external evaluations.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2008. Vol. 156, no 4, 387-409 p.
antitrust, cartels, merger policy, competition policy, ex-post evaluation, law enforcement
Research subject Economics
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-132329DOI: 10.1007/s10645-008-9101-6ISI: 000261374900004OAI: oai:DiVA.org:uu-132329DiVA: diva2:357514