Peer selection in EU intergovernmental negotiations
2009 (English)In: Journal of European Public Policy, ISSN 1350-1763, E-ISSN 1466-4429, Vol. 16, no 3, 356-377 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
In this paper we present the peer co-ordination approach which we apply to EU intergovernmental negotiations. This approach seeks to contribute to liberal intergovernmentalist' bargaining theory (Moravcsik 1993, 1998). It assumes that EU intergovernmental negotiations should be conceptualized as a rational learning process under uncertainty in which governments co-ordinate with peers in intergovernmental policy networks. In particular, we investigate the reasons why an EU government should select another government as a peer. Relying on a dataset on the EU Intergovernmental Conference of 1996 which led to the Amsterdam Treaty, we test five alternative hypotheses on peer selection (ex ante transnational co-ordination, preference, salience, power, and neighbourship; H1-H5). A random model provides us with a null model (H0) against which to test alternative models. We find that peer selection during these EU intergovernmental negotiations can best be explained by ex ante transnational co-ordination networks.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2009. Vol. 16, no 3, 356-377 p.
Bargaining theory, EU, intergovernmental negotiations, peer co-ordination, policy networks
Political Science (excluding Public Administration Studies and Globalization Studies)
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-139790DOI: 10.1080/13501760802662862ISI: 000264223600002OAI: oai:DiVA.org:uu-139790DiVA: diva2:382091