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The small-improvement argument rescued
Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy.
2011 (English)In: Philosophical quarterly (Print), ISSN 0031-8094, E-ISSN 1467-9213, Vol. 61, no 242, 171-174 p.Article in journal (Other academic) Published
Abstract [en]

Gustafsson and Espinoza have recently argued that the 'small-improvement argument', against completeness as a rationality requirement for preference orderings, is defective. They claim that the two main premises of the argument conflict with each other, and hence should not both be accepted. I show that this conflict can be avoided by modifying one of the premises.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2011. Vol. 61, no 242, 171-174 p.
National Category
Philosophy
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-143658DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2010.664.xISI: 000285305300010OAI: oai:DiVA.org:uu-143658DiVA: diva2:391022
Available from: 2011-01-24 Created: 2011-01-24 Last updated: 2017-12-11Bibliographically approved

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