The small-improvement argument rescued
2011 (English)In: Philosophical quarterly (Print), ISSN 0031-8094, E-ISSN 1467-9213, Vol. 61, no 242, 171-174 p.Article in journal (Other academic) Published
Gustafsson and Espinoza have recently argued that the 'small-improvement argument', against completeness as a rationality requirement for preference orderings, is defective. They claim that the two main premises of the argument conflict with each other, and hence should not both be accepted. I show that this conflict can be avoided by modifying one of the premises.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2011. Vol. 61, no 242, 171-174 p.
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-143658DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2010.664.xISI: 000285305300010OAI: oai:DiVA.org:uu-143658DiVA: diva2:391022