Care ethics and the moving animal: the roles of love and sympathy in encountering the animal being
2011 (English)In: Animal movements - moving animals: essays on direction, velocity and agency in humanimal encounters / [ed] Jacob Bull, Uppsala: Uppsala universitet , 2011Conference paper (Refereed)
The care-ethical approach to the animal issue has been developed with the notion of sympathy as a manner to acknowledge that non-human animals lead a relevantly moral existence. Josephine Donovan claims that this approach is inspired by David Hume’s emotive ethics, as well as Simone Weil’s notion of love. I argue that care-ethics may benefit from both Humean notion of moral sentiments, as well as from Weil’s thoughts on love, but that the distintion between the notions must be preserved. Sympathy acknowledges suffering. Love, though, acknowledges existence. The emotions, in relation to animals, thus acknowledge different aspects of the animal. It is logically inconsistent to claim both sympathy and attentive love as the most basic moral emotion. Attentive love is a distinct emotion with a distinct object which also suggests an ethical view where animals are existences among other kinds of existences, of which all are possible objects of love.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Uppsala: Uppsala universitet , 2011.
Skrifter från Centrum för genusvetenskap / Crossroads of knowledge, ISSN 1653-4093 ; 17
care ethics, emotivism, love, sympathy
Research subject Ethics
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-144452ISBN: 978-91-978186-7-4OAI: oai:DiVA.org:uu-144452DiVA: diva2:393421
Animal Movements • Moving Animals