The Time of Death's Badness
2012 (English)In: Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, ISSN 0360-5310, E-ISSN 1744-5019, Vol. 37, no 5, 464-479 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Those who endorse the view that death is in some cases bad for the deceaseda view that, as I shall explain, has considerable bearing on many bioethical issuesneed to address the following, Epicurean question: When is death bad for the one who dies? The two most popular answers are before death (priorism) and after death (subsequentism). Part of the support for these two views consists in the idea that a third answer, at notime (atemporalism), makes death unsatisfyingly different from other evils. I argue that this objection is mistaken, and that priorism and subsequentism face problems that atemporalism avoids. Moreover, I argue that if it is nonetheless insisted that we must find a time at which mydeath is bad for me, we can appeal to periods that begin before my death and end after my death. I end with some implications for posthumous harm.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Chicago: Univ. of Chicago P. for the Soc. for Health and Human Values , 2012. Vol. 37, no 5, 464-479 p.
deprivation approach, Epicurus, evil of death, posthumous harm, well-being
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-146134DOI: 10.1093/jmp/jhs039ISI: 000311668500004OAI: oai:DiVA.org:uu-146134DiVA: diva2:397616