Moral Relativism and Human Rights
2007 (English)In: Buffalo Human Rights Law Review, ISSN 1098-3643, Vol. 13, 73-85 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Some critics of international human rights law believe that human rights can only be valid relative to a given culture. It is clear that at least some of these critics believe that westerners ought to tolerate (what they consider to be) human rights violations in other parts of the world, since such violations may be morally acceptable in light of the moral values and standards accepted by the people involved. The problem with this line of reasoning is that it appears to be premised on the assumption that the theory of moral relativism enjoins tolerance of other moral views or that acceptance of such relativism is otherwise likely to bring about such tolerance. I shall, however, argue that the theory of moral relativism does not enjoin tolerance of other moral views, that there is no reason to believe that moral relativism is otherwise likely to bring about tolerance, and that therefore it does not matter to this debate whether moral relativism is a true (or defensible) theory.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
State University of New York at Buffalo, School of Law , 2007. Vol. 13, 73-85 p.
Human Rights, moral relativism, tolerance, cultural imperialism
Law and Society
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-12156OAI: oai:DiVA.org:uu-12156DiVA: diva2:39925