The good, the bad, and the ugly: technology transfer competence, rent-seeking, and bargaining power
2012 (English)In: Journal of world business (Print), ISSN 1090-9516, Vol. 47, no 4, 664-674 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
In this paper, we explore the relationships between subsidiary technology transfer competence, bargaining power and rent-seeking. In the multinational corporation, technology transfer competence is generally perceived as something desirable. We connect this bright side of subsidiary-level processes to a potentially uglier and darker side of the organization, namely that subsidiaries gain bargaining power that is exercised for bad ends, i.e., rent-seeking. Using an empirical analysis that comprises intrafirm technology transfers, this paper finds that technology transfer competence leads to greater subsidiary bargaining power that in turn increases rent-seeking behavior; but this competence does not directly affect rent-seeking. We suggest that bargaining power offers a key explanation for rent-seeking. This paper advances the understanding of subsidiary sources of power within the multinational corporation and the organizational determinants of rent-seeking, which is relevant to theory development as well as to managers.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2012. Vol. 47, no 4, 664-674 p.
Bargaining power, Competition and cooperation, Multinational corporation, Rent-seeking, Technology transfer
Research subject Business Studies
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-156643DOI: 10.1016/j.jwb.2011.08.002ISI: 000310121800018OAI: oai:DiVA.org:uu-156643DiVA: diva2:432714