The paper approaches gender and mobility from the perspective of the capability approach. It suggests that the question of whether mobility should be regarded as a distinct capability is a matter of theoretical and practical reasoning and offeres several theoretical reasons for why it is reasonable to add mobility to a list of capabilities.
It is suggested that mobility should be regarded as intrinsic to human well-being and that spatial/social/existential mobility should, although interrelated to other capabilities on a given list, be separated from them.
One reason for this is that spatial mobility has already been presented as a distinct capability, and social and existential mobility are implicated in various capability lists. This, taken together with the multidimensional nature of mobility presented in various aspects of mobility research, is perhaps the strongest argument for why mobility, in all its aspects, should be considered a fundamental distinct capability for a life of dignity; to be mobile is intrinsic to human well-being.
A second reason is that what is refered to as existential mobility (the capability of being emotionally, mentally, and intellectually moveable) is suggested in several of the capability lists and that because being spatially mobile always also means being socially and existentially mobile, the case for mobility as a distinct capability is strengthened.
Finally is is concluded that if it is reasonable to regard social/spatial/existential mobility as a distinct capability, this will have important consequences for research concerning justice and gender in a number of suggested research areas.
Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008.