Publications
Download:
File size:
1224 kb
Format:
application/pdf
Author:
Öberg, Anders (Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy)
Title:
Hilary Putnam on Meaning and Necessity
Department:
Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy
Publication type:
Doctoral thesis, monograph (Other academic)
Language:
English
Place of publ.: Uppsala Publisher: Department of Philosophy
Pages:
166
Year of publ.:
2011
URI:
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-160279
Permanent link:
http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-160279
ISBN:
978-91-506-2243-0
Subject category:
Philosophy
Research subject:
Theoretical Philosophy
Keywords(en) :
philosophy of language, philosophy of science, philosophy of mathematics, Hilary Putnam, W.V. Quine, Rudolf Carnap, realism, anti-realism
Abstract(en) :

In this dissertation on Hilary Putnam's philosophy, I investigate his development regarding meaning and necessity, in particular mathematical necessity. Putnam has been a leading American philosopher since the end of the 1950s, becoming famous in the 1960s within the school of analytic philosophy, associated in particular with the philosophy of science and the philosophy of language. Under the influence of W.V. Quine, Putnam challenged the logical positivism/empiricism that had become strong in America after World War II, with influential exponents such as Rudolf Carnap and Hans Reichenbach. Putnam agreed with Quine that there are no absolute a priori truths. In particular, he was critical of the notion of truth by convention. Instead he developed a notion of relative a priori truth, that is, a notion of necessary truth with respect to a body of knowledge, or a conceptual scheme. Putnam's position on necessity has developed over the years and has always been connected to his important contributions to the philosophy of meaning. I study Hilary Putnam's development through an early phase of scientific realism, a middle phase of internal realism, and his later position of a natural or commonsense realism. I challenge some of Putnam’s ideas on mathematical necessity, although I have largely defended his views against some other contemporary major philosophers; for instance, I defend his conceptual relativism, his conceptual pluralism, as well as his analysis of the realism/anti-realism debate.

Public defence:
2011-12-03, Geijersalen, Humanistiskt Centrum, Engelska parken, Uppsala, 13:15 (English)
Degree:
degree of Doctor of Philosophy
Supervisor:
Stenlund, Sören, professor emer (Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy)
Rider, Sharon, Docent (Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy)
Opponent:
Wagner, Pierre, Prof (Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne)
Available from:
2011-11-11
Created:
2011-10-19
Last updated:
2011-11-21
Statistics:
1315 hits
FILE INFORMATION
File size:
1224 kb
Mimetype:
application/pdf
Type:
fulltext
Statistics:
559 hits