A Defence of the Asymmetry in Population Ethics
2012 (English)In: Res Publica, ISSN 1356-4765, E-ISSN 1572-8692, Vol. 18, no 2, 145-157 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
A common intuition is that there is a moral difference between ‘making people happy’ and ‘making happy people.’ This intuition, often referred to as ‘the Asymmetry,’ has, however, been criticized on the grounds that it is incoherent. Why is there, for instance, not a corresponding difference between ‘making people unhappy’ and ‘making unhappy people’? I argue that the intuition faces several difficulties but that these can be met by introducing a certain kind of reason that is favouring but non-requiring. It is argued that there are structural similarities between the asymmetry and moral options and that the asymmetry can be defended as an instance of a moral option.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2012. Vol. 18, no 2, 145-157 p.
Asymmetry, Harm, Benefit, Procreation, Reasons, Options, Supererogation, Anti-natalism
Research subject Practical Philosophy
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-161009DOI: 10.1007/s11158-011-9164-0OAI: oai:DiVA.org:uu-161009DiVA: diva2:454034