Strong CEOs and Ownership Structure
(English)Manuscript (preprint) (Other academic)
The purpose of this paper is to examine compensation to Swedish executives over the period 1999 to 2008 and whether domestic and foreign equity ownership influence levels.
We use the strength of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO), defined as the ratio between total compensation to the CEO and total compensation to Group management, as our primary variable of interest. Cross-sectional regression analysis is used to examine if the domiciles of stockholders as well as firm specific factors can predict compensation.
We find a positive relationship between compensation levels to the CEO and foreign institutional investors. Higher foreign institutional holdings reduce the strength of the CEO. Our findings do not support the claim that compensation to CEO is related to firm behaviour or market related valuation measures.
This paper finds that holdings by foreign investors are negatively related to the strength of the CEO.
CEO, Compensation, Corporate governance, Chief executives, Board of Directors, Domiciles, Ownership, Sweden
Research subject Business Economics
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:hgo:diva-1213OAI: oai:DiVA.org:hgo-1213DiVA: diva2:462778
Working paper, please do not quote or publish without permission from the authors.
This version: May, 20112011-12-082011-12-082013-07-01Bibliographically approved