Vagueness, Incomparability, and the Collapsing Principle
2013 (English)In: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, ISSN 1386-2820, E-ISSN 1572-8447, Vol. 16, no 3, 449-463 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
John Broome has argued that incomparability and vagueness cannot coexist in a given betterness order. His argument essentially hinges on an assumption he calls the 'collapsing principle'. In an earlier article I criticized this principle, but Broome has recently expressed doubts about the cogency of my criticism. Moreover, Cristian Constantinescu has defended Broome's view from my objection. In this paper, I present further arguments against the collapsing principle, and try to show that Constantinescu's defence of Broome's position fails.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Springer Publishing Company, 2013. Vol. 16, no 3, 449-463 p.
Research subject Practical Philosophy
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-171711DOI: 10.1007/s10677-012-9352-9ISI: 000319997800002OAI: oai:DiVA.org:uu-171711DiVA: diva2:512113