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Aid, Institutions and Armed Conflict
Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Peace and Conflict Research.
(English)Manuscript (preprint) (Other academic)
National Category
Other Social Sciences not elsewhere specified
Research subject
Peace and Conflict Research
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-171717OAI: oai:DiVA.org:uu-171717DiVA: diva2:512171
Available from: 2012-03-26 Created: 2012-03-26 Last updated: 2012-04-24
In thesis
1. A Scramble for Rents: Foreign Aid and Armed Conflict
Open this publication in new window or tab >>A Scramble for Rents: Foreign Aid and Armed Conflict
2012 (English)Doctoral thesis, comprehensive summary (Other academic)
Abstract [en]

Previous research has not specified the circumstances under which foreign aid may increase the probability of armed conflict. The purpose of this dissertation is to address this gap by employing a theoretical framework in which foreign aid produces incentives for a rent-seeking scramble among elites. A set of conditions affecting the likelihood of armed conflict are identified and tested on global data in a series of statistical analyses. Paper I argues and finds that foreign aid increases the probability of armed conflict in states where there are few constraints on executive power, allowing for a scramble for rents. Paper II proposes and finds a threshold effect of aid, such that the likelihood of armed conflict increases only when aid has reached a certain level. Paper III suggests and demonstrates that sudden negative changes in aid flows enhance the risk of armed conflict as well as coup attempts, as aid shortfalls accelerate distributional conflict over aid rents. Paper IV claims and shows that civil wars are less likely to be terminated by settlement in the form of elections when conflict parties are dependent on rents. In sum, this dissertation contributes by theoretically specifying and empirically identifying conditions under which foreign aid increases the probability of armed conflict.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Uppsala: Department of Peace and Conflict Research, 2012. 40 p.
Series
Report / Department of Peace and Conflict Research, ISSN 0566-8808 ; 95
Keyword
armed conflict, civil conflict, civil war, coup d'etat, foreign aid, rents, institutions, aid dependence, aid shocks
National Category
Other Social Sciences not elsewhere specified
Research subject
Peace and Conflict Research
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-171720 (URN)978-91-506-2277-5 (ISBN)
Public defence
2012-05-12, Sal IV, Universitetshuset, Biskopsgatan 3, Uppsala, 12:15 (English)
Opponent
Supervisors
Available from: 2012-04-20 Created: 2012-03-26 Last updated: 2012-05-03Bibliographically approved

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CiteExportLink to record
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Citation style
  • apa
  • ieee
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More styles
Language
  • de-DE
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  • nn-NB
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  • Other locale
More languages
Output format
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  • asciidoc
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