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Author:
Sollenberg, Margareta (Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Peace and Conflict Research)
Title:
A Scramble for Rents: Foreign Aid and Armed Conflict
Department:
Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Peace and Conflict Research
Publication type:
Doctoral thesis, comprehensive summary (Other academic)
Language:
English
Place of publ.: Uppsala Publisher: Department of Peace and Conflict Research
Pages:
40
Series:
Report / Department of Peace and Conflict Research, ISSN 0566-8808; 95
Year of publ.:
2012
URI:
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-171720
Permanent link:
http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-171720
ISBN:
978-91-506-2277-5
Subject category:
Other Social Sciences not elsewhere specified
Research subject:
Peace and Conflict Research
Keywords(en) :
armed conflict, civil conflict, civil war, coup d'etat, foreign aid, rents, institutions, aid dependence, aid shocks
Abstract(en) :

Previous research has not specified the circumstances under which foreign aid may increase the probability of armed conflict. The purpose of this dissertation is to address this gap by employing a theoretical framework in which foreign aid produces incentives for a rent-seeking scramble among elites. A set of conditions affecting the likelihood of armed conflict are identified and tested on global data in a series of statistical analyses. Paper I argues and finds that foreign aid increases the probability of armed conflict in states where there are few constraints on executive power, allowing for a scramble for rents. Paper II proposes and finds a threshold effect of aid, such that the likelihood of armed conflict increases only when aid has reached a certain level. Paper III suggests and demonstrates that sudden negative changes in aid flows enhance the risk of armed conflict as well as coup attempts, as aid shortfalls accelerate distributional conflict over aid rents. Paper IV claims and shows that civil wars are less likely to be terminated by settlement in the form of elections when conflict parties are dependent on rents. In sum, this dissertation contributes by theoretically specifying and empirically identifying conditions under which foreign aid increases the probability of armed conflict.

Public defence:
2012-05-12, Sal IV, Universitetshuset, Biskopsgatan 3, Uppsala, 12:15 (English)
Degree:
degree of Doctor of Philosophy
Supervisor:
Hammarström, Mats, Docent (Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Peace and Conflict Research)
Wallensteen, Peter, Professor (Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Peace and Conflict Research)
Melander, Erik, Docent (Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Peace and Conflict Research)
Opponent:
Bussmann, Margit, Professor (University of Greifswald)
Available from:
2012-04-20
Created:
2012-03-26
Last updated:
2012-05-03
Statistics:
700 hits
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