uu.seUppsala University Publications
Change search
CiteExportLink to record
Permanent link

Direct link
Cite
Citation style
  • apa
  • ieee
  • modern-language-association
  • vancouver
  • Other style
More styles
Language
  • de-DE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
  • fi-FI
  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
  • sv-SE
  • Other locale
More languages
Output format
  • html
  • text
  • asciidoc
  • rtf
Naïve Point Estimation
Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
2013 (English)In: Journal of Experimental Psychology. Learning, Memory and Cognition, ISSN 0278-7393, E-ISSN 1939-1285, Vol. 39, no 3, 782-800 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

The capacity of short-term memory is a key constraint when people make online judgments requiringthem to rely on samples retrieved from memory (e.g., Dougherty & Hunter, 2003). In this article, theauthors compare 2 accounts of how people use knowledge of statistical distributions to make pointestimates: either by retrieving precomputed large-sample representations or by retrieving small samplesof similar observations post hoc at the time of judgment, as constrained by short-term memory capacity(the naı¨ve sampling model: Juslin, Winman, & Hansson, 2007). Results from four experiments supportthe predictions by the naı¨ve sampling model, including that participants sometimes guess values thatthey, when probed, demonstrably know have the lowest probability of occurring. Experiment 1 alsodemonstrated the operations of an unpredicted recognition-based inference. Computational modeling alsoincorporating this process demonstrated that the data from all 4 experiments were better predicted byassuming a post hoc sampling process constrained by short-term memory capacity than by assumingabstraction of large-sample representations of the distribution.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2013. Vol. 39, no 3, 782-800 p.
Keyword [en]
point estimation, sampling model, intuitive statistics
National Category
Psychology (excluding Applied Psychology)
Research subject
Psychology
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-183145DOI: 10.1037/a0029670ISI: 000318455900010OAI: oai:DiVA.org:uu-183145DiVA: diva2:562034
Funder
Swedish Research CouncilRiksbankens Jubileumsfond
Available from: 2012-10-23 Created: 2012-10-23 Last updated: 2017-12-07Bibliographically approved
In thesis
1. Is the Intuitive Statistician Eager or Lazy?: Exploring the Cognitive Processes of Intuitive Statistical Judgments
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Is the Intuitive Statistician Eager or Lazy?: Exploring the Cognitive Processes of Intuitive Statistical Judgments
2013 (English)Doctoral thesis, comprehensive summary (Other academic)
Abstract [en]

Numerical information is ubiquitous and people are continuously engaged in evaluating it by means of intuitive statistical judgments. Much research has evaluated if people’s judgments live up to the norms of statistical theory but directed far less attention to the cognitive processes that underlie the judgments.

The present thesis outlines, compares, and tests two cognitive models for intuitive statistical judgments, summarized in the metaphors of the lazy and eager intuitive statistician. In short, the lazy statistician postpones judgments to the time of a query when the properties of a small sample of values retrieved from memory serve as proxies for population properties. In contrast, the eager statistician abstracts summary representations of population properties online from incoming data.

Four empirical studies were conducted. Study I outlined the two models and investigated whether an eager or a lazy statistician best describes how people make intuitive statistical judgments. In general the results supported the notion that people spontaneously engage in a lazy process. Under certain specific conditions, however, participants were able to induce abstract representations of the experienced data. Study II and Study III extended the models to describe naive point estimates (Study II) and inference about a generating distribution (Study III). The results indicated that both the former and the latter type of judgment was better described by a lazy than an eager model. Finally, Study IV, building on the support in Studies I-III, investigated boundary conditions for a lazy model by exploring if statistical judgments are influenced by common memory effects (primacy and recency). The results indicated no such effects, suggesting that the sampling from long-term memory in a lazy process is not conditional on when the data is encountered.

The present thesis makes two major contributions. First, the lazy and eager models are first attempts at outlining a process model that could possibly be applied for a large variety of statistical judgments. Second, because a lazy process imposes boundary conditions on the accuracy of statistical judgments, the results suggest that the limitations of a lazy intuitive statistician would need to be taken into consideration in a variety of situations.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Uppsala: Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis, 2013. 84 p.
Series
Digital Comprehensive Summaries of Uppsala Dissertations from the Faculty of Social Sciences, ISSN 1652-9030 ; 92
Keyword
Lazy intuitive statistician, Eager intuitive statistician, Intuitive statistics, Sampling model, Numerical cognition
National Category
Psychology (excluding Applied Psychology)
Research subject
Psychology
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-211505 (URN)978-91-554-8827-7 (ISBN)
Public defence
2014-02-07, Hörsal Betty Pettersson, Blåsenhus, von Kraemers Allé 1A, Uppsala, 10:15 (English)
Opponent
Supervisors
Available from: 2014-01-16 Created: 2013-11-25 Last updated: 2014-01-24

Open Access in DiVA

No full text

Other links

Publisher's full text

Authority records BETA

Lindskog, MarcusWinman, AndersJuslin, Peter

Search in DiVA

By author/editor
Lindskog, MarcusWinman, AndersJuslin, Peter
By organisation
Department of Psychology
In the same journal
Journal of Experimental Psychology. Learning, Memory and Cognition
Psychology (excluding Applied Psychology)

Search outside of DiVA

GoogleGoogle Scholar

doi
urn-nbn

Altmetric score

doi
urn-nbn
Total: 524 hits
CiteExportLink to record
Permanent link

Direct link
Cite
Citation style
  • apa
  • ieee
  • modern-language-association
  • vancouver
  • Other style
More styles
Language
  • de-DE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
  • fi-FI
  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
  • sv-SE
  • Other locale
More languages
Output format
  • html
  • text
  • asciidoc
  • rtf