uu.seUppsala University Publications
Change search
CiteExportLink to record
Permanent link

Direct link
Cite
Citation style
  • apa
  • ieee
  • modern-language-association
  • vancouver
  • Other style
More styles
Language
  • de-DE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
  • fi-FI
  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
  • sv-SE
  • Other locale
More languages
Output format
  • html
  • text
  • asciidoc
  • rtf
Moral Disagreement: Actual vs Possible
Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
2012 (English)In: Disagreement and Skepticism / [ed] Diego Machucha, London: Routledge, 2012, 90-108 p.Chapter in book (Refereed)
Abstract [en]

Suppose that the disagreement that exists regarding moral issues supports a skeptical or anti-realist conclusion of some sort (i.e., a conclusion to the effect that our moral convictions are not justified or cannot be (objectively) true). If so, could we plausibly generate the same conclusion by appealing to the mere possibility of such disagreement? This question has recently caused some controversy. In my paper, I explain why the answer is no and why the actual existence of certain types of disagreement have more weight, in the context of the realism/anti-realism debate, than the mere possibility of disagreements of the pertinent types. The view that ethical anti-realism can be defended with reference to the mere possibility of certain types of disagreement is sometimes held to lead to global anti-realism (on the ground that disagreement is, in any area, always possible). The second aim of the paper is to show that this contention is false. On can appeal to the mere possibility of certain types of disagreement in ethics in support of an anti-realist view and still, plausibly and coherently, deny global anti-realism.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
London: Routledge, 2012. 90-108 p.
Series
Routledge Studies in Contemporary Philosophy, ISSN 0415532833
Keyword [en]
Actual disagreement, possible disagreement, peer disagreement, ethical realism, convergence
National Category
Ethics
Research subject
Ethics
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-188788ISBN: 978-0415532839 OAI: oai:DiVA.org:uu-188788DiVA: diva2:579187
Available from: 2012-12-19 Created: 2012-12-19

Open Access in DiVA

No full text

By organisation
Ethics and Social Philosophy
Ethics

Search outside of DiVA

GoogleGoogle Scholar

isbn
urn-nbn

Altmetric score

isbn
urn-nbn
Total: 454 hits
CiteExportLink to record
Permanent link

Direct link
Cite
Citation style
  • apa
  • ieee
  • modern-language-association
  • vancouver
  • Other style
More styles
Language
  • de-DE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
  • fi-FI
  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
  • sv-SE
  • Other locale
More languages
Output format
  • html
  • text
  • asciidoc
  • rtf