Moral Disagreement: Actual vs Possible
2012 (English)In: Disagreement and Skepticism / [ed] Diego Machucha, London: Routledge, 2012, 90-108 p.Chapter in book (Refereed)
Suppose that the disagreement that exists regarding moral issues supports a skeptical or anti-realist conclusion of some sort (i.e., a conclusion to the effect that our moral convictions are not justified or cannot be (objectively) true). If so, could we plausibly generate the same conclusion by appealing to the mere possibility of such disagreement? This question has recently caused some controversy. In my paper, I explain why the answer is no and why the actual existence of certain types of disagreement have more weight, in the context of the realism/anti-realism debate, than the mere possibility of disagreements of the pertinent types. The view that ethical anti-realism can be defended with reference to the mere possibility of certain types of disagreement is sometimes held to lead to global anti-realism (on the ground that disagreement is, in any area, always possible). The second aim of the paper is to show that this contention is false. On can appeal to the mere possibility of certain types of disagreement in ethics in support of an anti-realist view and still, plausibly and coherently, deny global anti-realism.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
London: Routledge, 2012. 90-108 p.
, Routledge Studies in Contemporary Philosophy, ISSN 0415532833
Actual disagreement, possible disagreement, peer disagreement, ethical realism, convergence
Research subject Ethics
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-188788ISBN: 978-0415532839OAI: oai:DiVA.org:uu-188788DiVA: diva2:579187