2013 (English)In: International Encyclopedia of Ethics / [ed] Hugh LaFolette, Wiley-Blackwell, 2013Chapter in book (Refereed)
In the philosophical literature one often meets the locution “the argument from moral disagreement”, as if there is only one such argument. But there are in fact several arguments that appeal to moral disagreement, arguments that take quite different routes to their anti-realist conclusions. In what follows, some of these arguments are reconstructed and discussed.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Research subject Ethics
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-193567DOI: 10.1002/9781444367072.wbiee131ISBN: 9781444367072OAI: oai:DiVA.org:uu-193567DiVA: diva2:603152
FunderSwedish Research Council, 421-2012-988