uu.seUppsala University Publications
Change search
ReferencesLink to record
Permanent link

Direct link
The intuition of neutrality and consequentialist thinking: potential antinatalist implications
Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
2013 (English)In: SpringerPlus, ISSN 2193-1801, Vol. 2Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

Many people seem to share some version of what has been called the “intuition of neutrality” aboutcreating new people, which, roughly, says that there exists a certain range of levels of well-beingsuch that creating people within this range is, in itself, morally neutral, but creating people with alevel of well-being outside this range is not morally neutral. In this paper, I will discuss differentinterpretations of this intuition, and specifically distinguish between what I will call counterfactualinterpretations and Do-interpretations of the intuition. I will argue that it is hard to interpret theintuition in a way that does not give rise to antinatalist moral reasons, i.e. reasons favoring an emptyfuture population, when it comes to choices of social policy. In particular, this holds if we assume aconception of relevant outcomes of actions reflecting consequentialist moral intuitions. In the end, I will formulate a normative principle of welfare promotion which I argue respects the most plausiblecounterfactual version of the neutrality intuition.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Springer, 2013. Vol. 2
Keyword [en]
Intuition of neutrality, Population ethics, Necessitarianism, Antinatalism, Consequentialism
National Category
Research subject
Practical Philosophy
URN: urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-196589DOI: 10.1186/2193-1801-2-99OAI: oai:DiVA.org:uu-196589DiVA: diva2:610391
Available from: 2013-03-11 Created: 2013-03-11 Last updated: 2013-03-11

Open Access in DiVA

No full text

Other links

Publisher's full texthttp://www.springerplus.com/content/2/1/99

Search in DiVA

By author/editor
Pettersson, Karl
By organisation
Ethics and Social Philosophy

Search outside of DiVA

GoogleGoogle Scholar
The number of downloads is the sum of all downloads of full texts. It may include eg previous versions that are now no longer available

Altmetric score

Total: 181 hits
ReferencesLink to record
Permanent link

Direct link