Effects of eligibility screening in the sickness insurance: Evidence from a field experiment
2013 (English)In: Labour Economics, ISSN 0927-5371, Vol. 20, 48-56 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
We study the effects of screening stringency in the Swedish sickness insurance system by exploiting a field experiment. The experiment was conducted on 270,000 individuals in two geographical areas with the treatment group randomized by date of birth. The screening of eligibility was reduced for the treated by the postponement of the requirement for a doctor's certificate from day eight to day fifteen in a sickness benefit spell. The results show that extending the waiting period increased the length of sickness absence by on average 0.6 days. The experiment increased sickness benefit expenses but reduced the number of visits to a doctor. Our results show that postponing the requirement for a doctor's certificate increases public expenses for the sickness insurance system.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2013. Vol. 20, 48-56 p.
Monitoring, Randomized experiment, Absenteeism, Sickness insurance
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-197141DOI: 10.1016/j.labeco.2012.10.003ISI: 000315012400005OAI: oai:DiVA.org:uu-197141DiVA: diva2:611819