Stationary Equilibria in Bargaining with Externalities
2008 (English)Report (Other academic)
This paper studies infinite-horizon bargaining between a seller and multiple buyers when externalities are present. We extend the analysis in Jehiel & Moldovanu (1995a) by allowing for both pure and mixed equilibria. A characterization of the stationary subgame perfect equilibria in generic games is presented. Equilibria with delay exist only for strong positive externalities. Since each buyer receives a positive payoff when the seller makes an agreement with some other buyer, positive externalities induce a war of attrition between buyers.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Uppsala: Department of Economics, Uppsala University , 2008. , 30 p.
Working paper / Department of Economics, Uppsala University (Online), ISSN 1653-6975 ; 2006:29
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-211154OAI: oai:DiVA.org:uu-211154DiVA: diva2:665594
This is a revised version of "Delay in Bargaining with Externalities", Working paper / Department of Economics, Uppsala University (Online), ISSN 1653-6975; 2006:29. (http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-19265)2013-11-202013-11-202013-11-20Bibliographically approved