Screening Stringency in the Disability Insurance Program
2014 (English)In: The B.E. Journals in Economic Analysis & Policy, ISSN 1935-1682, E-ISSN 1935-1682, Vol. 14, no 3, 873-891 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
We propose a strategy for assessing how the inflow to the disability insurance program has been governed over time. Using ex-post mortality, we analyze the ex-ante health of individuals entering the program, compared to individuals not entering the program in the same year. Applying this strategy to Sweden, we find large variation in the relative health of new beneficiaries compared to non-beneficiaries over time. Some of the fluctuations correspond well to formal changes to screening stringency. However, we also find large variation in health during periods when no changes to formal eligibility criteria have been pursued.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2014. Vol. 14, no 3, 873-891 p.
Disability insurance, Screening stringency, Proportional hazard model
Research subject Economics
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-213741DOI: 10.1515/bejeap-2013-0095ISI: 000338842000009OAI: oai:DiVA.org:uu-213741DiVA: diva2:683337