THE PRIZE AND PRICE OF REBELLION: MODELLING THE POPULATIONS INCENTIVES TO SUPPORT SEPERATIST REBELLION
Independent thesis Basic level (degree of Bachelor), 10 credits / 15 HE creditsStudent thesis
Economic models of rebellion has often described it as a criminal act of preying upon the population and the natural resources available for a quick income. However, empirical findings contradict some of the predictions of these models. From a collective rent seeking perspective this paper seeks to construct plausible explanations for the experience of conflicts in areas with low levels of "lootable" resources and that natural resource endowments may actually decrease the likelihood of conflict. Corresponding with other literature on collective action, support is also found for the effect that cooperation and distribution of rewards from rebellion greatly affects the likelihood of success for rebel groups.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Collective action, Rebellion, Natural resources, Armed conflict onset
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-219574OAI: oai:DiVA.org:uu-219574DiVA: diva2:700629
Liang, Che-Yuan, Forskare
Ohlsson, Henry, Professor