Optimal carbon abatement in the presence of lump-sum transfer costs
(English)Manuscript (preprint) (Other academic)
Lump-sum transfers as a means of tackling climate change are mainly perceived as a theoretical construct to achieve the first best Pareto optimum. The previous literature on lump-sum transfers normally focuses on the two polar cases: the absence of lump-sum transfers and perfect or unconstrained lump-sum transfers, leaving the middle way aside. In this paper, we attempt to explore the unmarked part by developing a model where transfer costs are explicitly taken into account. We show that whether the Pareto optimum characterized by the equalization of marginal abatement costs is attainable depends on the formation of transfer costs. When the marginal transfer cost is zero, the separability of equity and efficiency under perfect lump-sum transfers is kept. However, when the marginal transfer cost is positive, the optimum with equalization of marginal abatement costs is neither attainable, nor desirable. We also simulate a policy experiment in China to review the optimal abatement and transfer patterns between China's provinces within a framework of imperfect lump-sum transfers. The highlighted welfare gains is supportive of considering lump-sum transfers as a national climate change policy.
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-222693OAI: oai:DiVA.org:uu-222693DiVA: diva2:712046