"Pure Time Preference": Reply to Lowry and Peterson
2014 (English)In: Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, ISSN 0279-0750, E-ISSN 1468-0114Article in journal (Refereed) Published
A pure time preference is a preference for something to occur at one point in time rather than another, merely because of when it occurs in time. Such preferences are widely regarded as paradigm examples of irrational preferences. However, Rosemary Lowry and Martin Peterson have recently argued that, for instance, a pure time preference to go to the opera tonight rather than next month may be rationally permissible, even if the amounts of intrinsic value realized in both cases are identical. In this reply, we argue that Lowry and Peterson's argument is unsuccessful.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Research subject Practical Philosophy
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-224090DOI: 10.1111/papq.12053OAI: oai:DiVA.org:uu-224090DiVA: diva2:715297