More on the Mirror: Reply to Fischer and Brueckner
2014 (English)In: Journal of Ethics, ISSN 1382-4554, E-ISSN 1572-8609, Vol. 18, no 4, 341-351 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
John Martin Fischer and Anthony L. Brueckner have argued that a person’s death is, in many cases, bad for him, whereas a person’s prenatal non-existence is not bad for him. Their suggestion relies on the idea that death deprives the person of pleasant experiences that it is rational for him to care about, whereas prenatal non-existence only deprives him of pleasant experiences that it is not rational for him to care about. In two recent articles in The Journal of Ethics, I have objected that it is irrelevant what it is in fact rational for the person to care about. Fischer and Brueckner have replied to my critique. In this paper I respond to their latest pair of replies.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2014. Vol. 18, no 4, 341-351 p.
Anthony L. Brueckner; Deprivation approach; Evil of death; John Martin Fischer; Prenatal non-existence
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-226137DOI: 10.1007/s10892-014-9171-4OAI: oai:DiVA.org:uu-226137DiVA: diva2:724147