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Social norms and moral hazard
Uppsala University, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
1997 (English)Report (Other scientific)
Abstract [en]

The probability of income loss depends on talent and effort. Effort has positive externalities and therefore individuals are awarded status in proportion to their perceived diligence. The social norm requires more effort from individuals perceived as more

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Uppsala: Department of Economics , 1997.
Series
Working paper / Department of Economics, Uppsala University, 1997:28
Keyword [en]
Försäkring Socialförsäkring; Social insurance; Social norms; Moral hazard
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-45076OAI: oai:DiVA.org:uu-45076DiVA: diva2:72983
Available from: 2008-10-17 Created: 2008-10-17

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