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Bargaining, binding contracts and competitive wages
Uppsala University, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
2003 (English)In: Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 43, no 2, 296-311 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

In a model where many workers bargain with one firm and sign binding contracts, we show existence of a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium. If the production function satisfies decreasing returns, each worker receives a share of his marginal product (t

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Elsevier , 2003. Vol. 43, no 2, 296-311 p.
Keyword [en]
Bargaining; Decreasing returns; Competitive wages
National Category
Economics
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-46732OAI: oai:DiVA.org:uu-46732DiVA: diva2:74639
Available from: 2008-10-17 Created: 2008-10-17 Last updated: 2011-01-13

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