Bargaining, binding contracts and competitive wages
2003 (English)In: Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 43, no 2, 296-311 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
In a model where many workers bargain with one firm and sign binding contracts, we show existence of a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium. If the production function satisfies decreasing returns, each worker receives a share of his marginal product (t
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Elsevier , 2003. Vol. 43, no 2, 296-311 p.
Bargaining; Decreasing returns; Competitive wages
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-46732OAI: oai:DiVA.org:uu-46732DiVA: diva2:74639