Imperfect Information, Wage Formation, and the Employability of the Unemployed
2002 (English)Report (Other scientific)
This paper considers the optimal hiring strategy of a firm that is unable to observe the productive abilities of all its applicants. Whom the firm considers as hireable, will depend crucially on the extent to which the firm can use its wage setting to mi
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Uppsala: Institute for Labour Market Policy Evaluation , 2002.
, Working Paper Series 2002:17
Hiring; Imperfect information; Discrimination; Employed job seekers; Efficiency wages; Turnover; Unemployment; Welfare; Policy.
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-46922OAI: oai:DiVA.org:uu-46922DiVA: diva2:74829