Informational Models in Deontic Logic: A Comment on "Ifs and Oughts" by Kolodny and MacFarlane
2014 (English)In: Filosofiska notiser, ISSN 2002-0198, Vol. 1, no 1, 91-103 p.Article in journal (Other academic) Published
Recently, in their paper "Ifs and Oughts", Niko Kolodny and John MacFarlane have proposed modeling deontic logic on the basis of so-called informational models, with a new interpretation of both the deontic obligation operator and the indicative conditional, and claim that they can use this approach to solve some problems related to the conflict between so-called subjective (e.g. versions of consequentialism according to which the expected value of different alternatives given the beliefs or knowledge of an agent are morally relevant) and objective versions of the moral "ought" (e.g. versions of consequentialism according to which the consequences that actually would be realized by different alternatives are morally relevant). In this paper, I will critically discuss their claims. I claim that at least their indicative conditional, given the normative assumptions they seem to accept, yield problematic results in some contexts, and that its alleged benefits in the cases they discuss can be explained in other ways, viz. by distinguishing between different senses of the normative expressions.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2014. Vol. 1, no 1, 91-103 p.
Research subject Practical Philosophy
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-238917OAI: oai:DiVA.org:uu-238917DiVA: diva2:772752