Adaptive Evolution of Cooperation through Darwinian Dynamics in Public Goods Games
2011 (English)In: PLoS ONE, ISSN 1932-6203, Vol. 6, no 10, e25496Article in journal (Refereed) Published
The linear or threshold Public Goods game (PGG) is extensively accepted as a paradigmatic model to approach the evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas. Here we explore the significant effect of nonlinearity of the structures of public goods on the evolution of cooperation within the well-mixed population by adopting Darwinian dynamics, which simultaneously consider the evolution of populations and strategies on a continuous adaptive landscape, and extend the concept of evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) as a coalition of strategies that is both convergent-stable and resistant to invasion. Results show (i) that in the linear PGG contributing nothing is an ESS, which contradicts experimental data, (ii) that in the threshold PGG contributing the threshold value is a fragile ESS, which cannot resist the invasion of contributing nothing, and (iii) that there exists a robust ESS of contributing more than half in the sigmoid PGG if the return rate is relatively high. This work reveals the significant effect of the nonlinearity of the structures of public goods on the evolution of cooperation, and suggests that, compared with the linear or threshold PGG, the sigmoid PGG might be a more proper model for the evolution of cooperation within the well-mixed population.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2011. Vol. 6, no 10, e25496
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-260055DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0025496ISI: 000296517000006PubMedID: 22046240OAI: oai:DiVA.org:uu-260055DiVA: diva2:846210