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Punished for austerity? The electoral consequences of fiscal adjustments
Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Government.ORCID iD: 0000-0003-0847-5601
(English)Manuscript (preprint) (Other academic)
Abstract [en]

In both economics and political science, conventional wisdom states that austerity policies are unpopular among voters, and that those governments which implement tax hikes and cutbacks in public spending will lose votes in the subsequent election. However, this claim has received little empirical support. This paper finds that parties which implement fiscal consolidations are punished by the voters in the following election, a result that goes against previous research, but one which is in line with conventional wisdom. The estimated effects are larger when the adjustments are visible and when there is a unified control of policymaking. There do not appear to be any electoral consequences for implementing fiscal expansions.

National Category
Political Science (excluding Public Administration Studies and Globalization Studies)
Research subject
Political Science
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-274337OAI: oai:DiVA.org:uu-274337DiVA: diva2:896308
Available from: 2016-01-20 Created: 2016-01-20 Last updated: 2016-03-09
In thesis
1. Austerity Politics: Is the Electorate Responsible?
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Austerity Politics: Is the Electorate Responsible?
2016 (English)Doctoral thesis, comprehensive summary (Other academic)
Abstract [en]

This thesis contributes to the public finance literature concerned with fiscal sustainability, and consists of an introduction and four stand-alone essays. The first three essays analyse the reasons why governments accumulate large levels of debt. In the first essay, I find that parties that implement fiscal consolidations are punished by the voters in the following election. However, there does not appear to be a rewarding effect for governments that implement fiscal expansions. The second essay, which is co-authored with Rafael Ahlskog, shows how voter opposition to fiscal consolidation is shaped by moral considerations and feelings of personal responsibility. More precisely, we argue that voters are more likely to refuse fiscal consolidation when they do not feel responsible for the public debt. The third essay argues that misperceptions about the business cycle would have caused fiscal problems even if policy-making was conducted by independent experts. According to my estimates, biased projections have weakened annual budget balances by approximately one per cent of GDP. In the fourth essay, I argue that budgetary mechanisms created to improve fiscal discipline have a bias toward a reduced public sector. Because discretionary decisions are usually required to adjust public expenditures to price and wage increases, periods of rapid growth have repeatedly caused the welfare state to shrink. I use the introduction to discuss the commonalities between the essays and to situate the field of public finance in a broader, historical context.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Uppsala: Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis, 2016. 35 p.
Series
Digital Comprehensive Summaries of Uppsala Dissertations from the Faculty of Social Sciences, ISSN 1652-9030 ; 124
Keyword
Deficit bias, Fiscal policy, Perceptions, Political economy, Responsibility, Retrospective voting
National Category
Political Science (excluding Public Administration Studies and Globalization Studies)
Research subject
Political Science
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-274342 (URN)978-91-554-9459-9 (ISBN)
Public defence
2016-03-11, Auditorium Minus, Gustavianum, Akademigatan 3, Uppsala, 10:15 (Swedish)
Opponent
Supervisors
Available from: 2016-02-19 Created: 2016-01-21 Last updated: 2016-03-09

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Nyman, Pär

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Citation style
  • apa
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More styles
Language
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Output format
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