Moral Reasons for Moral Beliefs: A Puzzle for Moral Testimony Pessimism
2015 (English)In: Logos & Episteme: an International Journal of Epistemology, ISSN 2069-0533, E-ISSN 2069-3052, Vol. 4, 429-448 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
According to moral testimony pessimists, the testimony of moral experts does not provide non-experts with normative reasons for belief. Moral testimony optimists hold that it does. We first aim to show that moral testimony optimism is, to the extent such things may be shown, the more natural view about moral testimony. Speaking roughly, the supposed discontinuity between the norms of moral beliefs and the norms of non-moral beliefs, on careful reflection, lacks the intuitive advantage that it is sometimes supposed to have. Our second aim is to highlight the difference in the nature of the pragmatic reasons for belief that support moral testimony optimism and moral testimony pessimism, setting out more clearly the nature and magnitude of the challenge for the pessimist.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2015. Vol. 4, 429-448 p.
Moral Testimony; Reasons for Belief: Reasons; Moral Epistemology.
Philosophy Philosophy, Ethics and Religion
Research subject Ethics; Philosophy
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-291296OAI: oai:DiVA.org:uu-291296DiVA: diva2:925232